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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jared Hergesheimer appeals from the district court's intermediate 
appellate decision affirming his conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Hergesheimer with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 7.) 
Hergesheimer moved to suppress "evidence of the standardized field sobriety 
tests, the results of the lntoxilyzer 5000 EN breath tests results, and any 
statements made by the Defendant" based on the assertion that officers had 
extended his stop and violated his Miranda rights. (R., pp. 44-50.) The trial court 
determined that in the course of an investigation into potential domestic violence 
the officers acquired reasonable suspicion of underage drinking and DUI, which 
justified extending the stop to include investigation of those crimes, and denied 
the motion. (R., p. 90; Tr., p. 65, L. 13 - p. 66, L. 14.1) The court also rejected 
the claim of a Miranda violation, finding both that Miranda warnings were not 
required and that they were "adequately given." (R., p. 90; Tr., p. 66, L. 14 - p. 
67, L. 3.) 
The matter proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury found 
Hergesheimer guilty. (R., p. 119.) The magistrate entered judgment and 
Hergesheimer timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 120, 123-25.) The 
1 All citations to the transcript are to "HERGESHEIMER tr.pdf." 
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district court affirmed on appeal. (R., pp. 252-69.) Hergesheimer filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the district court's appellate opinion. (R., pp. 271-73.) 
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ISSUES 
Hergesheimer states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Magistrate err when it denied Mr. Hergesheimer's 
Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment of acquittal because the 
State presented insufficient evidence to establish the corpus 
delicti independent of Mr. Hergesheimer's admission? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion 
to Suppress statements obtained in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the corpus delicti doctrine in 
Idaho. Has Hergesheimer failed to show that he is entitled to application of 
the corpus delicti doctrine on this appeal? 
2. Has Hergesheimer failed to show error in the lower courts' determinations 
that his statements were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hergesheimer Is Not Entitled To Application Of The Corpus Delicti Doctrine On 
This Appeal 
A. Introduction 
During the trial for DUI the state presented evidence that Hergesheimer 
admitted both drinking and driving. (Tr., p. 74, L. 14 - p. 75, L. 14; State's Exhibit 
1.) At the conclusion of the evidence Hergesheimer moved for acquittal, 
asserting the state failed to establish the corpus delicti. (Tr., p. 140, L. 22 - p. 
144, L. 23.) The magistrate denied the motion. (Tr., p. 150, L. 8-p. 151, L. 17.) 
Hergesheimer raised the issue to the district court on appeal. (R., pp. 177-81.) 
After submission of briefing, but before the district court decided the matter on 
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the corpus delicti rule was no longer 
good law in Idaho. State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81, 294 P.3d 1093 (2013). The 
district court affirmed the magistrate on the merits without addressing the effect 
of the Suriner decision. (R., pp. 266-69.) 
On appeal to this Court Hergesheimer asserts that he is entitled to the 
application of the corpus delicti rule, despite its lack of validity, by application of 
ex post facto prohibitions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14.) He also argues that the 
district and trial courts failed to properly apply the corpus delicti rule. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-16.) Hergesheimer's argument that ex post facto considerations 
apply in this case are incorrect because the Supreme Court of the United States 
has specifically rejected Hergesheimer's argument and held that the Ex Post 
Facto Clause only applies to legislative enactments, not judicial decisions. 
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Moreover, even if the rejected corpus delicti rule were applicable, Hergesheimer 
has failed to show that the lower courts misapplied it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"When the district court renders an opinion in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the Supreme Court directly reviews the district court's opinion." Ada 
County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 353, 
298 P.3d 245, 247 (2013). 
C. The Corpus Delicti Rule No Longer Applies In Idaho 
The Idaho Supreme Court has abandoned the corpus delicti rule. State v. 
Suriner, 154 Idaho 81, 294 P .3d 1093 (2013). The Court rejected the rationales 
underpinning the rule: "We believe that the adversary process provides a better 
mechanism for protecting against the consequences of coerced confessions than 
does the court-created corpus delicti rule." kl at 88, 294 P.3d at 1100. 
"Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there may be, 
we hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho." kl Because the 
corpus delicti rule "no longer applies in Idaho," Hergesheimer's argument based 
on application of the corpus delicti rule is without merit.2 
2 An acquittal is only required "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction 
of such offense or offenses." I.C.R. 29(a). The corpus delicti rule is not 
constitutionally required for the state to prove the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Suriner, 154 Idaho at 86, 294 P.3d at 1098. Because the evidence is 
constitutionally adequate regardless of application of the corpus delicti rule, 
Hergesheimer is not entitled to the remedy of an acquittal even if he could show 
that his confession was not sufficiently corroborated under that rule. 
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Despite this Court's clear holding that the corpus delicti rule "no longer 
applies in Idaho," Hergesheimer contends that it applies in his case, arguing that 
to not apply it would violate ex post facto prohibitions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-
14.) His argument does not withstand analysis because only retroactive statutes, 
not judicial decisions, are barred as ex post facto. 
The Ex Post Facto prohibitions found in U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 10 and 
Idaho Const., Art. I, § 16, "prevent the enactment of any statute which punishes 
as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which 
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or 
which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law 
at the time when the act was committed." State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 867, 
275 P.3d 864, 867 (2012) (emphasis added, internal quotes and citation omitted). 
The prohibition on ex post facto laws "'is a limitation on the powers of the 
Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of 
government."' Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001) (quoting Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)). Thus, the ex post facto doctrine has 
no application in this case. 
Hergesheimer, relying on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), 
argues that the ex post facto legal standards apply to judicial decision-making 
just as they do to legislative acts by application of due process. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 9-12.) This reading of Bouie was directly rejected by the Supreme 
Court of the United States more than a decade ago. "To the extent petitioner 
argues that the Due Process Clause incorporates the specific prohibitions of the 
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Ex Post Facto Clause as identified in Calder [v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 
(1798)], petitioner misreads Bouie." Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458. "The Ex Post 
Facto Clause, by its own terms, does not apply to courts. Extending the Clause 
to courts through the rubric of due process thus would circumvent the clear 
constitutional text." ~ at 460. "Strict application of ex post facto principles" to 
the decision-making process of courts "would unduly impair the incremental and 
reasoned development of precedent that is the foundation of the common law 
system." !.Q at 461. Hergesheimer's exhortation that this Court apply ex post 
facto principles is without merit. 
Rather than ex post facto standards, due process prohibits retroactive 
application of judicial decisions only if they "are unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." 
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461. Hergesheimer has not argued that Suriner cannot be 
applied to his case under this standard, and has in fact argued against 
application of this standard. (Appellant's brief, p. 9 (contending that the reading 
of the Bouie opinion specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Rogers should 
be applied because it "provides clearer guidance").) This Court should, at 
Hergesheimer's specific request, not reach the question of whether application of 
Suriner in this case is consistent with the due process standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Rogers. 
Even if the correct due process standard were applied, as opposed to the 
erroneous one advocated by Hergesheimer, there is no error. As explained by 
the Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule in Idaho was not "designed to protect 
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any constitutional or statutory rights or even to prevent convictions based upon 
false confessions." Suriner, 154 Idaho at 85, 294 P.3d at 1097. It "was not 
adopted by either our Constitution or by legislation." kl at 86, 294 P.3d at 1098. 
Its corroboration requirement was minimal. kl at 85-86, 294 P.3d at 1097-98. A 
similar court-created requirement for corroboration of an accuser's testimony in a 
sex crime was abandoned over thirty years previously. kl at 87, 294 P.3d at 
1099.3 Given the rule's questionable genesis, infrequent application, and lack of 
appreciable benefits, the Suriner decision was not "unexpected and indefensible 
by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." 
It does not violate due process to review the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting Hergesheimer's conviction without application of any corroboration 
requirements. Because Hergesheimer has failed to show that he is 
constitutionally entitled to the application of the corpus delicti rule in this case, he 
has failed to show error by the district court in affirming his conviction. 
D. Even If The Corpus Delicti Rule Applied, Hergesheimer's Incriminating 
Statements Were Corroborated 
Review of the record shows that evidence of Hergesheimer's incriminating 
statements was sufficiently corroborated. "[O]nly slight corroborating facts were 
required" under the abandoned corpus delicti rule. Suriner, 154 Idaho at 84, 294 
P.3d 1096. Suriner's confession to sexual abuse was corroborated by the fact he 
3 The case abandoning the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of sex 
offense victims, State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981 ), did so only 
prospectively, but based on the incorrect interpretation of the Bouie opinion 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Rogers. 
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repeated his confession several days later; the confession was videotaped; other 
statements by Suriner were also incriminating; and a physician's examination did 
not rule out sexual abuse. kt at 83, 294 P.3d at 1095. In other cases (1) the 
presence of the defendant's sheep in the state was sufficient to corroborate his 
confession he had brought them here illegally; (2) evidence that the facts were 
different than claimed, evidence that statements making insurance claims were 
inconsistent, and other incriminating statements by the defendant were sufficient 
corroboration of a confession to obtaining money under false pretenses; and (3) 
the fact of death of the child while in defendant's care and consistent autopsy 
findings were sufficient to corroborate a confession the defendant smothered her 
baby. kt at 83-86, 294 P.3d at 1095-98. 
In this case Hergesheimer's recorded statements that he was driving and 
that he had been drinking were corroborated by evidence that he was in fact 
legally under the influence, was encountered in a parking lot of an apartment 
complex where he did not live, and was near his car when encountered. (See, 
~' R., pp. 267-68.) That Hergesheimer's incriminating statements were 
repeated, recorded, and consistent with the physical circumstances in which he 
was encountered provides at least "slight" corroboration of his statements. 
Hergesheimer's argument that he is entitled to the benefit of a rule that "no 
longer applies in Idaho" is without merit. Even if the corpus delicti rule were 
applied he has still failed to show error. 
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II. 
Hergesheimer Has Failed To Show Error In The Lower Courts' Determinations 
That His Statements Were Not Obtained In Violation Of His Miranda Rights 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate concluded that Miranda warnings were not required, and 
that even if required that the requirements of Miranda were met. (Tr., p. 66, L. 14 
- p. 67, L. 3.) The district court affirmed on both bases. (R., pp. 263-66 (holding 
the trial court did not err in both finding that Hergesheimer was "not in custody for 
Miranda purposes" and that Hergesheimer was provided with warnings and 
chose to speak anyway).) Hergesheimer argues the lower courts erred, 
asserting he was in custody and that he did not make a valid waiver of his rights. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-21.) Because application of the correct legal standards 
to the facts found by the trial court support both prongs of the district court's 
analysis affirming the trial court's ruling, Hergesheimer has failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether police are required to provide Miranda 
warnings presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 
848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's findings of fact for clear error, but gives free review to the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts. kl 
"The trial court's conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 
294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000). See also State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 851-
10 
52, 26 P.3d 31, 34-35 (2001); State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 
976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267, 47 P.3d 763, 770 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences 
is vested in the trial court." Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 104 P.3d at 979. See 
also State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000); 
State v. Nobles, 122 Idaho 509, 835 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1991). The appellate 
court applies all presumptions in favor of the trial court's exercise of that power, 
and the trial court's findings on such matters will be upheld if they are supported 
by substantial evidence. Nobles, 122 Idaho at 512, 835 P.2d at 1323. 
C. Hergesheimer Has Failed To Demonstrate That He Was In Custody 
Equivalent To Formal Arrest At The Time He Made The Statements He 
Seeks To Suppress 
Before an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the 
interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, including the 
right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 
However, "police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to 
everyone whom they question." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
Miranda requires warnings only when the individual being questioned is in 
custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "custody" for 
purposes of Miranda turns on whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); see also State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 
11 
576-77, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171-72 (2010). A mere investigative detention does not 
trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576-77, 634 P.2d 435, 438-39 
(1981). The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes 
of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement 
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; see 
also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). When applying this test 
the "only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position 
would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; State v. Doe, 
137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 
587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Factors that may be considered 
include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the 
nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other persons. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990 P.2d at 757; State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 
117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). "The burden of showing custody 
rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to 
administer Miranda warnings." State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, _, 304 P.3d 304, 
307 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Under this standard even imprisonment, standing alone, may not be 
enough to trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. The custody inquiry 
under Miranda "depends upon whether [custody] exerts the coercive pressure 
that Miranda was designed to guard against - the danger of coercion that results 
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from the interaction of custody and official interrogation." Maryland v. Shatzer, 
559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (emphasis original, brackets and internal quotations 
omitted). Custody to the degree associated with formal arrest alone is not 
enough to create the necessity of Miranda warnings, but is merely a "necessary 
and not sufficient condition" to finding a requirement of Miranda warnings. ~ 
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that "lawful 
imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive 
pressures identified in Miranda." ~ (holding that inmate who invoked right to 
silence could be re-interrogated after passage of time and Miranda waiver 
despite lack of break in custody). 
The facts of this case fully support the conclusion that Hergesheimer was 
not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. Officers initially 
made contact with Hergesheimer because of a report of a physically violent 
domestic disturbance. (Tr., p. 7, L. 10 - p. 11, L. 9; p. 24, L. 18 - p. 27, L. 18.) 
Two officers talked with Hergesheimer while two other officers talked to the 
female he was with at the time. (Tr., p. 11, L. 4 - p. 12, L. 24; p. 27, L. 19 - p. 30 
L. 4.) Officers initially handcuffed Hergesheimer, but twice told him he was not 
under arrest. (Tr., p. 30, L. 5 - p. 32, L. 11.) They advised him of his Miranda 
rights and questioned him about the suspected domestic violence. (Tr., p. 32, L. 
12 - p. 33, L. 1.) Once they confirmed there had been no domestic violence they 
removed the handcuffs before questioning Hergesheimer in relation the DUI they 
had come to suspect. (Tr., p. 13, L. 2 - p. 16, L. 14.) 
13 
The facts of this case show Hergesheimer was not in custody equivalent 
to formal arrest. Police contacted Hergesheimer in a public place (a parking lot) 
where Hergesheimer had stopped voluntarily. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 11-17.) Although 
there were four officers present, two of the officers were in contact with his 
girlfriend over 100 feet away. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 22-25; p. 27, L. 19 - p. 28, L. 10.) 
Although he had been placed in handcuffs initially, he was told he was not under 
arrest and the handcuffs were removed before he was questioned about the DUI. 
(Tr., p. 15, L. 23 - p. 16, L. 5; p. 31, Ls. 18-21.) Other than the initial use of 
handcuffs, which had ceased before the questioning at issue, this investigative 
stop is unremarkable. Hergesheimer failed to prove he was in custody 
equivalent to formal arrest. 
Hergesheimer argues that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda 
because his "freedom of movement was completely deprived, he was handcuffed 
and surrounded by four much larger, armed officers that dictated his every 
movement." (Appellant's brief, p. 20 (emphasis original).) This statement, 
however, is a grossly inaccurate description of Hergesheimer's circumstances at 
the time he made the challenged statements. Although there were four officers 
present at the scene (two of which were training officers), Hergesheimer was 
questioned by a single officer and there is no evidence whatsoever that the other 
officers were even close, much less that they "surrounded" him. In addition, as 
noted above, the evidence clearly established that officers removed the 
handcuffs before field sobriety testing and questioning. Because Hergesheimer 
fails to even address his custody level at the relevant time, he has failed to show 
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error in the district court's appellate determination that the magistrate did not err 
by concluding that Hergesheimer was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
D. Hergesheimer Validly Waived His Miranda Rights When He Spoke With 
Officers After Being Warned Of Those Rights 
The Supreme Court of the United States has "retreated from the language 
and tenor of the Miranda opinion, which suggested that the Court would require 
that a waiver be specifically made." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 
(2010) (internal quotes, cites, and ellipse omitted). Thus, an express waiver of 
Miranda rights is not required and an "implicit waiver of the right to remain silent 
is sufficient to admit a suspect's statement into evidence." kl (internal quotes 
and cites omitted). "[A]n understanding of his rights and a course of conduct 
indicating waiver" is sufficient to show waiver. kl (internal quotes and cites 
omitted). To show an implicit waiver the state must therefore show that a 
Miranda warning was given, that the defendant understood it, and that the 
defendant thereafter made uncoerced statements. kl (internal quotation 
omitted). 
In this case one of the officers gave Hergesheimer Miranda warnings. 
Thereafter Hergesheimer made uncoerced statements, first about the inquiries 
about possible domestic violence and then about possible DUI. Finally, 
Hergesheimer had no trouble communicating with officers or following 
instructions, either because of language, intelligence, or intoxication, showing he 
in fact understood what he was being told. The evidence in this case supports 
the magistrate's conclusion there was a valid waiver. 
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Hergesheimer argues that the officer's statement that reading Miranda 
made it sound like they were on a television show and his reaction to the Miranda 
waiver (asking for a drink of water) "resulted in an inadequate and involuntary 
waiver of Miranda." (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) As stated above, the law does 
not require an express waiver, and the mention of how reading the rights was 
comparable to televisions shows did not reduce Hergesheimer's understanding 
of his rights. Although Hergesheimer's argument is factually accurate, it is legally 
without merit. Hergesheimer has failed to show error by the lower courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
appellate decision affirming the judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 20 4 
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